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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAMON R. MUNFORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010812-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support Munford's conviction for 
murder? "To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict, 
the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and 
them demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 114, 989 P.2d 1065. 
Because this issue was not preserved below, it is reviewed for plain error. State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 P.3d 346. 
2. Whether Munford's counsel's failure to make a motion for directed verdict 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? The claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for "failing to make a motion for directed verdict succeeds only if the State's 
evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 
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(memorandum decision); see Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993). Where 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, 
the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Damon R. Munford appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Third District Court after a conviction of murder, a first degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Damon R. Munford was charged by information filed in Third District Court 
with murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-203 (R. 
2-6). 
After a preliminary hearing, Munford was bound-over for trial upon a finding of 
probable cause (R. 23-25). Prior to trial, the trial court granted Munford's motion to 
sever his trial from that of his co-defendant, John Kiriluk (R. 38-41, 53). After a two-
day trial, Munford was convicted by a jury (R. 112, 204-05). Munford was sentenced 
to five years to life in the Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and 
restitution to the victim's family in the amount of $1,600 (R. 116). 
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Approximately two years after sentencing, Munford filed a pro se motion for 
resentencing on the grounds that his trial counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal 
(R. 125-28). The trial court denied the motion and Munford appealed (R. 129-30, 133-
34). On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Third District for 
resentencing (R. 162). Munford was then resentenced and filed a timely notice of 
appeal with the Third District Court (R. 173-76). The appeal was then transferred to 
this Court from the Utah Supreme Court (R. 190-91). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In the case below, the State alleged that the appellant, Damon Munford, caused 
the death of Michael Brown (R. 5-6). The matter was set for trial which began on 
November 6, 1996. In support of its case, the state called six witnesses. Munford did 
not present a defense. 
A. Testimony of Jack Retallick 
Jack Retallick testified that he was the victim's father-in-law (R. 204: 81). 
Retallick described Brown as a twenty three year old man standing about six feet one 
inch at about two hundred pounds (R. 204: 83). Despite Brown's imposing physique, 
Retallick considered him to be gentle and easy-going (R. 204: 83). He also described 
Brown as learning disabled who functioned on about a 12 to 16 year old level (R. 204: 
83). Retallick also testified that from time to time Brown would wear a baseball hat, 
carried a Harley-Davidson wallet with a chain on it, and wore several rings (R. 204: 
88-89). 
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carried a Harley-Davidson wallet with a chain on it, and wore several rings (R. 204: 
88-89). 
The State elicited that Retallick was with Brown in Retallick's home on the 
evening of March 21, 1986 (R. 204: 83). At some point during the evening two men 
showed up at the house (R. 204: 83). The two men came downstairs and met Retallick 
and Brown (R. 204: 83). Brown introduced one of the men as "John" however he 
"didn't really say who the other guy was" (R. 204: 83). Brown spoke with the two 
visitors for about ten minutes and the left with them (R. 204: 83-4). 
During the course of the examination the State showed Retallick two pictures 
which it asserted were of Munford (R. 204: 86-7). Retallick testified that the person 
depicted in the pictures was Munford, one of the people who came to his home and met 
with Brown on the evening of March 21, 1986 (R. 204: 86). Retallick did not see 
Brown after that evening (R. 204: 89). 
B. Testimony of Jo Lynn Penrod 
Jo Lynn Penrod testified that she rented a room from John Kiriluk and was his 
roommate (R. 204: 93). Penrod testified that she knew Munford and his wife Rebecca 
Munford through her association with Kiriluk (R. 204: 94-5). According to Penrod, 
Munford was Kiriluk's buddy or partner (R. 204: 95). Penrod also knew Brown whom 
she met though Kiriluk (R. 204: 95). 
Penrod testified that approximately two weeks before March 21, 1996, Kiriluk 
became angry with Brown (R. 204: 96). Penrod testified that at this time, she 
overheard Kiriluk state that he was going to kill Brown (R. 204: 97). Penrod testified 
that Munford was present when Kiriluk made these statements (R. 204: 97). 
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The discontent between Kiriluk and Brown stemmed from some missing 
propynyl (R. 204: 97-9). Propynyl is a chemical that can be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine (R. 204: 98). According to Penrod, Kiriluk had an amount of the 
chemical which he gave to Brown (R. 204: 98). Brown, in turn, was to give the 
propynyl to a person named Hoge who was going to use the chemical to make 
methamphetamine (R. 204: 98). Kiriluk apparently believed Brown did not give the 
chemical to Hoge (R. 204: 97). To compound things, Penrod understood that Kiriluk 
still owed money for the chemical (R. 204: 99). Kiriluk was worried that if he could 
not pay for the propynyl his source for the chemicals would "come after him" (R. 204: 
99). Penrod testified that she believed Munford was present when Kiriluk relayed these 
facts (R. 204: 99). 
Penrod further testified that she was at her apartment on the evening of March 2 
1, 1996 (R. 204: 100). When she arrived, Penrod saw Kiriluk, Brown, and Munford 
in the back of a truck (R. 204: 100). Penrod testified that she also saw Chablis Scott 
(Kiriluk's girlfriend) and Rebecca Munford in the front of the truck (R. 204: 100). 
Penrod believed the truck belonged to Munford (R. 204: 100). Kiriluk spoke with 
Penrod and told her they were going to play pool and they left, leaving Penrod behind 
(R. 204: 100). 
C. Testimony of Chablis Scott 
Chablis Scott testified that she had been Kiriluk's girlfriend for several months 
(R. 204: 108). Scott also knew Munford and his wife whom she met through Kiriluk 
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(R. 204: 108-9). According to Scott, Munford was Kiriluk's "backup, his tough guy" 
(R. 204: 109). 
Scott testified that Kiriluk was upset with Brown because Kiriluk had given 
Brown some proprynyl who in turn gave it to Hoge and then at some point the propynyl 
had disappeared (R. 204: 111). Scott stated that Munford was aware of these facts (R. 
204: 111). According to Scott, Kiriluk got the chemical from a friend who had got it 
from some "Mexicans" (R. 204: 111). Scott understood that Kiriluk paid one hundred 
dollars for the chemical and he still owed five hundred dollars (R. 204: 112). Scott 
believed Kiriluk was concerned that if he did not repay the balance owing for the 
chemicals his creditors "would come after him" (R. 204: 112). 
Scott testified that she was with Kiriluk, Munford, and Rebecca Munford at 
Kiriluk's apartment during the late afternoon hours of March 21, 1986 (R. 204: 113). 
While they were in the apartment, Kiriluk told Scott to get a plastic trash bag and put it 
on the floor in the bedroom and then put a chair on top of the bag (R. 204: 116). Scott 
complied (R. 204: 116). At some point thereafter, Kiriluk and Munford left to get 
Brown (R. 204: 116). 
Eventually, Kiriluk and Munford returned with Brown (R. 204: 114). They sat 
with Brown in the living room of the apartment while Scott and Rebecca Munford 
stayed in the kitchen (R. 204: 114-15). As the three men sat in the living room, an 
argument ensued between Kiriluk and Brown (R. 204: 114-15). Scott believed they 
were arguing about where Hoge was (R. 204: 114). Munford also spoke a few words 
to Brown, but was not arguing (R. 204: 114-15). After about fifteen or twenty 
minutes, Kiriluk, Munford, and Brown went into the bedroom and closed the door (R. 
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204: 115). About five or ten minutes later, Munford came out of the bedroom and 
closed the door (R. 204: 117). 
While Kiriluk was in the room with Brown, Scott testified that she heard some 
loud voices (R. 204: 117). Kiriluk then came out of the room rubbing one of his hands 
(R, 204: 117). Scott asked Kiriluk what happened and Kiriluk said he hit Brown (R. 
204: 117). At that point, Scott walked into the bedroom and saw Brown sitting on the 
chair that she placed in the bedroom (R. 204: 117-18). Brown was rubbing his face 
and Scott observed that Brown's cheek and eye area appeared to be red (R. 204: 118). 
Scott then saw Brown drop something (R. 204: 118). Scott asked Brown what he had 
dropped and he said it was his tooth (R. 204: 118). 
Scott came out of the bedroom and saw Kiriluk, Munford, and Brown putting on 
their coats (R. 204: 118-19). Scott asked what they were doing and Kiriluk stated they 
were going to Riverton to Hoge's parents home and asked if Scott would like to go (R. 
204: 119). 
Then Scott, Kiriluk, Brown, and Munford and his wife got into Rebecca 
Munford's truck to leave (R. 204: 119). Rebecca Munford drove while Soctt sat in the 
passenger seat and the three men sat in the bed of the truck (R. 204: 119). 
Scott and the others drove to an area in Riverton that she recognized as an area 
where Hoge's parents lived (R. 204: 120). However, when they got close to the 
residence, Kiriluk told Rebecca Munford to go in a direction heading away from the 
home and up into the hills (R. 204: 120-21). Scott testified that Munford told his wife 
to drive up into the hills (R. 204: 121). Rebecca drove a "little ways" up the dirt road 
and stopped while the men "relieved" themselves (R. 204: 121). Munford then told 
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her to go up further and the truck finally stopped in an area which Scott described as 
remote and desolate (R. 204: 122). 
Scott observed Kiriluk and Munford get out the truck (R. 204: 122). Munford 
went around to the driver's side while Kiriluk went to the passenger's side (R. 204: 
122). Kiriluk then went to the driver's side of the truck and then he and Munford went 
to the back of the truck and Kiriluk "got [Brown] out" (R. 204: 123). Scott testified 
that Kiriluk, Munford, and Brown then walked away from the truck and that Munford 
was "holding onto" Brown (R. 204: 123). 
Scott testified that she had taken methamphetamine that day, and it was a dark 
night with no moon (R. 204: 145). Scott testified that she sometimes hallucinated when 
she used drugs (R. 204: 145). Scott also testified that she needed glasses but does not 
have them and was not wearing them the night of the incident (R. 204: 153). Scott 
further testified that she cannot see things far away (R. 204: 162). On the stand, Scott 
was unable to see what type of pattern defense counsel was wearing (R. 204: 135). 
After the three men walked away, Rebecca told Scott that she had forgotten to 
give them the knife, so Scott called them back (R. 204: 124). Rebecca then gave Scott 
a knife which Scott recognized as belonging to Rebecca (R. 204: 124). Either Kiriluk 
or Munford came back to the truck at which time Scott handed over the knife (R. 204: 
126). Scott then testified that the three men walked off down a hill (R. 204: 127). Scott 
testified that she was scared, but that she had no reason to believe Brown would be 
killed (R. 204: 128). 
About ten minutes later, Kiriluk and Munford returned to the truck without 
Brown (R. 204: 128). The four remaining people got into the front of the truck and 
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Munford said, "It's done" (R. 204: 129). Rebecca Munford replied, "Good. Let's go." 
(R. 204: 129). 
On the drive home, Scott testified that Munford appeared excited and 
commented that he had enjoyed the thrill, or words to that effect (R. 204: 130). Scott 
also testified that Kiriluk asked for his shirt, and she reached under the seat and felt 
what she thought was "the knife" that was wet and sticky and wrapped in what she 
thought was a bandana (R. 204: 131). Scott also observed a tree branch on the seat of 
the truck which was not there when they first left for Riverton (R. 204 132). Also, at 
some point during the drive, Kiriluk gave Scott a hat which belonged to Brown and a 
bandana with some of Brown's other personal belongings (R. 204: 132-33). 
Eventually, they returned to Kiriluk's apartment (R. 204: 134). Upon arrival, 
they immediately went into the bedroom and Scott took the bandana Kiriluk had given 
her and put it on the foot of the bed (R. 204: 134). Kiriluk then unwrapped the 
bandana and dumped out the contents (R. 204: 134). Scott then observed Brown's 
rings, address book, wallet and "a few other things." (R. 204: 135). Kiriluk said those 
items had to be burned to get rid of them and Munford agreed (R. 204: 135). Kiriluk 
then went outside and, some time later, returned with a few items including the address 
book and some papers (R. 204: 135-36). Scott and Rebecca then took the remaining 
items and burned them at Kiriluk's demand (R. 204: 136). 
D. Testimony of Rebecca Munford 
Rebecca Munford testified that she had been married to Munford for about six 
years (R. 204: 163). She also said that she had known Kiriluk for about a week and a 
half prior to March 2 1, 1986 (R. 204: 165). Rebecca confirmed that Kiriluk and 
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Munford were friends and that on the night of the incident, Kiriluk asked Munford to 
be his "backup muscle" (R. 204: 165). Rebecca testified that she was aware that 
Brown had taken some chemicals for Kiriluk and had not been able to recover them (R. 
204: 166-67). 
Rebecca testified that she was at Kiriluk's apartment on the late afternoon of 
March 21, 1986 with Kiriluk, Munford, and Scott (R. 204: 168). Rebecca saw Kiriluk 
and Munford leave the apartment and she understood they were going to get Brown to 
discuss the missing chemicals (R. 204: 168). The first time when Rebecca met Brown 
was when Kiriluk and Munford returned with to the apartment (R. 204: 169). 
According to Rebecca, Kiriluk was in the living room with Brown discussing the 
missing chemicals (R. 204: 169). Kiriluk appeared to be upset (R. 204: 170). Rebecca 
testified that Munford stayed in the kitchen and only went into the living room once or 
twice (R. 204: 170). Rebecca testified that Kiriluk and Brown went into the bedroom 
(R. 204: 170). Rebecca testified Kiriluk and Brown were the only ones who went into 
the bedroom; Munford did not (R. 204: 170). 
After about fifteen or twenty minutes, Rebecca testified that she heard a thump 
and she, Munford, and Scott went to see what happened (R. 204: 171). Kiriluk stated 
that he knocked Brown's tooth out (R. 204: 171). After thai, Brown and Kiriluk went 
back the living room and Kiriluk continued to express his dissatisfaction about the 
missing chemicals (R. 204: 171). After about twenty minutes, Kiriluk suggested that 
they go to Hoge's house to recover his property (R. 204: 172). 
The five of them got into Rebecca's truck and headed for Hoge's house (R. 204: 
173). When they approached the area where Rebecca understood Hoge lived, Kiriluk 
said, "Forget it. This guy is just messing with us, let's go up in the hills" (R. 204: 
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193). She then drove the truck up a dirt road (R. 204: 174). After an unknown 
distance, she stopped the truck and Kiriluk told spoke Rebecca continue up and around 
a bend (R. 204: 175). Rebecca again stopped the truck and Kiriluk and Munford got 
out (R. 204: 176). 
Rebecca testified that at this point, Munford told her that he loved her and 
Kiriluk was joking around (R. 204: 176). Kiriluk then asked Rebecca for her knife, 
which she always carries a knife for protection (R. 204: 176). Rebecca testified that 
Kiriluk "grabbed my purse" and dumped it out took the knife from her (R. 204: 178). 
Rebecca testified that Kiriluk told Brown, "Let's go for a walk" (R. 204: 178). 
Kiriluk and Brown walked side by side and Munford "was kind of behind [Brown], off 
to one side (R. 204: 178). They walked over a hill and were out of sight (R. 204: 
179). About twenty minutes later, Kiriluk and Munford returned without Brown (R. 
204: 179). The four remaining adults then drove back to Kiriluk1 s apartment (R. 204: 
181). During the drive back, Rebecca testified that Kiriluk and Munford appeared 
nervous (R. 204: 181). 
When they reached the apartment, Kiriluk went to the bathroom while the other 
three went to the bedroom (R. 204: 181). Kiriluk then came into the bedroom and put 
Rebecca's knife in front of her (R. 204: 183). Rebecca explained that one should not 
put a knife away wet so she pulled it out of the scabbard wiped it off and put it back 
into her purse (R. 204: 183). Rebecca testified that Kiriluk had Brown's hat, address 
book, two lighters, and three rings (R. 204: 184). Kiriluk then expressed that they 
needed to dispose of Brown's belongings (R. 204: 184). Kiriluk then went to the 
parking lot and attempted to bum them (R. 204: 184). Given that the items were not 
readily susceptible to incineration, Kiriluk was only partially successful (R. 204: 184). 
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Kiriluk returned, put the remaining items in a bag and instructed Scott and Rebecca to 
get rid of them (R. 204: 184). Scott and Rebecca did as instructed (R. 204: 185). 
E, Testimony of Deputy Sheriff Darren Carr 
Deputy Car testified that on March 22, 1986, he was called out to Bluff dale were 
some people had found a body (R. 204: 196). The body was found down off a hill 
about 10 yards from a dirt road (R. 204: 198). The officer's description of the area 
was consistent with the area that Scott and Rebecca described as last having seen Brown 
(R. 204: 197-98). 
Deputy Carr testified that the body he observed had a black eye, a missing tooth 
and a gaping wound to the neck (R. 204: 200). Ultimately, the deputy was able to 
determine that the body he located was in fact the body of Brown (R. 204: 204). While 
at the scene, Deputy Carr also observed two rocks which were found approximately six 
feet above Mr. Brown's head (R. 204: 202). Both of the rocks had blood on them (R. 
204: 202). During the course of the investigation Rebecca Munford's knife was 
recovered (R. 204: 214). Kiriluk's fingerprint was found on the knife (R. 204: 215). 
F. Testimony of expert witness Dn Edward Leis 
Dr. Leis testified that he is the State's deputy chief medical examiner (R. 205: 
17-18). Dr. Leis examined Brown's body on March 23, 1986 (R. 205: 20). During 
his examination, Dr. Leis observed two sets of major injuries (R. 205: 22-3). The 
first was a laceration and skull fractures on the back of Brown's head (R. 205: 22-4). 
Dr. Leis opined that those injuries could have been caused by the rocks deputy Carr 
found by Brown's body (R. 205: 24-5). Dr. Leis also observed a large gaping wound 
12 
of the body, Dr. Leis concluded that Brown's death was caused by the injury to his 
neck(R. 205:31). 
Dr. Leis could not determine which injury came first, but he gave his opinion 
that the injury to the back of the head came first (R. 205: 30). Dr. Leis testified that 
the injuries to the back of the head probably would not have been fatal (R. 205: 32-3). 
Dr. Leis also testified that it was more likely that the injuries to the head resulted from 
the victim falling down and striking an object on the ground (R. 205: 33-6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's entire case against Munford boiled down to one simple proposition: 
Munford must be guilty because he was present when Brown was killed. However, the 
State's case against Munford does not constitute a crime because merely being present 
when a crime is committed, even with prior knowledge that the crime was going to take 
place, is not a crime. The evidence offered was insufficient to establish that Munford 
intentionally participated in the crime charged. Thus, the trial court erred in submitting 
the case to the jury. Furthermore, Munford was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because his counsel failed to make a motion for a directed verdict when the evidence 
was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. The jury's verdict was unreasonable and 




THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
MUNFORD INTENTIONALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE MURDER 
The state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Munford was guilty of 
murder. Although Munford's counsel failed to motion for a directed verdict at the 
close of the State's case, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the case to the 
jury because there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. 
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 P.3d 346 (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 
1022 (Utah 1996); and State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). 
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant 
must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 17. "To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and them demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 
98, 114, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 
(Utah 1991)). Then the defendant must show "that the insufficiency was so obvious 
and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, at 117. 
A review of all the evidence shows that another person, Kiriluk, not Munford, 
killed Brown. Moreover, Munford did not act as an accomplice or partner in the 
killing of Brown. 
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A person commits murder if he or she: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; [or] 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(l)(a)-(c). Additionally, a person who does not directly 
cause the death of another may also be found guilty of murder as an accomplice if 
"acting with the mental state required for the commission of [murder]," he or she 
"solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage" in committing the murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. 
"As with any other crime, the State must prove the elements of accomplice 
liability beyond a reasonable doubt." State ex. rel. V.T., 2000 UT App 189, 19, 5 
P.3d 1234. "Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one an 
accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in perpetration of 
the crime." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980). Rather, "there must 
be evidence showing that the defendant engaged in some active behavior, or at least 
speech or other expression that served to assist or encourage the primary perpetrators in 
committing the crime." V.T., 2000 UT App 189, at 116. 
In State ex. rel. V.T., 2002 UT App 189, the defendant and two friends went to 
a relative's apartment. Id. at 12. The relative left for a short period of time and when 
she returned the boys were gone and so were two of her guns. Id. at 13. The relative 
tracked the boys down and demanded they returned her property. Id. The boys 
refused and the relative reported the theft to the police. Id. Two days later, the 
relative found that her camcorder was missing. Id. at 14. The police recovered the 
camcorder at a pawnshop, and inside the camcorder found a videotape. Id. The tape 
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had a recorded conversation where one of the defendant's friends telephoned another 
friend, in the defendant's presence, and discussed pawning the stolen camcorder. Id. at 
^5. The defendant never spoke or gestured during any of this footage. Id. 
This Court vacated the defendant's conviction of the theft of the camcorder 
finding that the evidence did not support the charge. Id. at ifl7. The evidence showed 
only that the defendant "was present with the other two youths, albeit at multiple 
times," such as before, during, and after the theft of the camcorder. Id. at 1fl8. 
Further, there was "no indication ... that [defendant] had instigated, incited to action, 
emboldened, helped, or advised the other two boys in planning or committing the 
theft." Id. The circumstantial evidence showed only that the defendant was a 
"witness—not an accomplice—to the theft of the camcorder." Id. 
This Court's ruling in V.T. was based in part on State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120 
(Utah App. 1998). In Labrum, the defendant was convicted of criminal homicide 
stemming from his involvement in a drive by shooting. Id. at 122. The defendant's 
sentence was enhanced because the crime was allegedly committed with two or more 
people. Id. at 123-24. This Court found that the other witness "had been present 
before, during, and after the shooting and later was in defendant's presence when he 
boasted to a third party about the shooting." Id. Even though the witness endorsed the 
boasting, this Court held these findings "were insufficient to show that he solicited, 
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided" the defendant in 
committing the shooting. Id. 
In the present case, marshaling all the evidence in favor of the verdict does not 
support the jury's conclusion. The damaging evidence against Munford was primarily 
the testimony of Chablis Scott, Kiriluk's girlfriend (R. 204: 108). 
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The sum of Scott's testimony that can be viewed against Munford is insufficient 
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott testified that Munford was Kiriluk's 
"backup, his tough guy" (R. 204: 109). Scott testified that although Kiriluk directed 
Rebecca Munford to drive past their intended destination, it was allegedly Munford that 
told Rebecca to drive up into the hills (R. 204: 121). Scott also testified that Munford 
was "holding onto" Brown as they walked away from the car out of sight (R. 204: 
123). Scott farther testified that when Kiriluk and Munford returned without Brown, 
that Munford said "It's done" (R. 204: 129). 
It was also uncontradicted that Munford was present with the assailant and 
victime before, during, and after the crime. 
From this evidence, the State argued that either Munford committed the crime or 
that he was an accomplice. This evidence alone is insufficient to support either 
proposition. Even if Munford approved of the crime, this is insufficient evidence to 
support the jury verdict. See Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123-24. Even if Munford was 
Kiriluk's tough guy, this does not satisfy the theory of accomplice liability. Scott 
merely testified that Munford was holding onto Brown; she did not testify that he 
dragged Brown or that Brown was unwilling to go. In fact, Scott failed to testify that 
Munford showed or used any force with Brown (R. 204: 123). 
Also, both Scott and Rebecca Munford testified that they thought Kiriluk was 
only going to attempt to scare Brown (R. 204: 128, 191-92). Even if Munford directed 
his wife to drive up further into the hills, there is no reason to believe that Kiriluk 
intended to commit the crime he did. In fact, Rebecca Munford directly contradicted 
Scott's testimony at this point, and stated that it was Kiriluk (R. 204: 175, 193). 
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Rebecca also stated that it was Kiriluk who was walking with Brown, not Munford (R. 
204: 178). 
Moreover, the fact that Munford was with the victim before and during the 
crime is insufficient to establish guilt. In V, T., the evidence also established that the 
defendant was present before and during the crime. 2002 UT App 189 at if 18. Just 
like V. T., the circumstantial evidence in this case indicates that Munford did not 
instigate, incite to action, embolden, help, or advise Kiriluk in this crime. 
The circumstantial evidence shows at most that Munford was a witness to a 
crime. There was no evidence indicating that he directly participated in any crime. At 
most, the evidence showed that Munford helped or escorted Brown while walking (R. 
204: 123). The evidence did show that Munford was not in the room when Kiriluk hit 
Brown, knocking out his tooth (R.204: 117). The evidence did show that Kiriluk's 
fingerprints were found on the alleged weapon (R. 204: 215). The evidence did show 
that the slit to the throat caused Brown's death (R. 205: 27). The State's own expert 
testified that "a fall would be more likely an explanation" 1o explain the bumps on 
Brown's head and thus the blood on the rocks (R. 205: 35). 
Thus, the evidence shows that Munford neither stabbed Brown with the knife, 
nor hit Brown on the head with rocks. The evidence does not support that Munford 
was an accomplice. Munford was only a witness to a crime. 
The fact that Munford witnessed a crime is insufficient to find him guilty of a 
crime. There was insufficient evidence to show that Munford solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided Kiriluk in committing the crime. It is 
evident that the trial court committed plain error in submitting this case to the jury. 
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POINT II 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Munford was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to 
motion for a directed verdict at the end of the State's case. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); see Tillman v. 
Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on 
failure to move to dismiss where evidence to convict was sufficient). In order to 
establish ineffective counsel, it is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 125, 1 
P.3d 546 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State 
v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
If this Court finds that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, then 
under the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Cook, the two prong test set out in 
Strickland is satisfied. Because the evidence was insufficient to submit this case to the 
jury, Munford's counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of 
professional judgment." Kelley, 2000 UT 41, at 1f25. Additionally, but for the failure 
to make a motion for a directed verdict, Munford would not have been convicted of 
murder. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Munford asks that this Court vacate his conviction of 
murder, a first degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of February, 2003. 
largarefP. Lindsay 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-5-203 
(xnl aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
(xvii) aggravated arson, Section 76-6-103; 
(xviii) aggravated burglary, Section 76-6-203; 
(xix) aggravated robbery, Section 76-6-302; or 
(xx) an offense committed in another jurisdiction 
which if committed in this state would be a violation 
of a crime listed in Subsection (l)(h); 
) the homicide was committed for the purpose of: 
(i) preventing a witness from testifying; 
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or 
participating in any legal proceedings or official in-
vestigation; 
(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, pro-
viding evidence, or participating in any legal proceed-
ings or official investigation; or 
(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful govern-
mental function or enforcement of laws; 
j) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal 
>lic official, or a candidate for public office, and the 
aicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that 
cial position, act, capacity, or candidacy; 
a) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforce-
nt officer, executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, 
son official, firefighter, judge or other court official, 
)r, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is 
ler on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or 
elated to that official position, and the actor knew, or 
sonably should have known, that the victim holds or 
held that official position; 
) the homicide was committed by means of a destruc-
> device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar 
ice which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any 
ce, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or was mailed 
lelivered; 
m) the homicide was committed during the act of 
awfully assuming control of any aircraft, train, or 
er public conveyance by use of threats or force with 
}ht to obtain any valuable consideration for the release 
he public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, 
any other person aboard, or to direct the route or 
cement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert 
trol over the public conveyance; 
a) the homicide was committed by means of the ad-
listration of a poison or of any lethal substance or of 
r substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, 
quantity; 
}) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained 
a shield, hostage, or for ransom; or 
p) the homicide was committed in an especially hei-\ 
is, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, 
£ of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, 
lous physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
tim before death. 
£gravated murder is a capital felony. 
*) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated 
fder or attempted aggravated murder that the defen-
Jt caused the death of another or attempted to cause 
yieath of another: 
|f '(i) under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
tress for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
iexcuse; or 
pi (ii) under a reasonable belief that the circum-
stances provided a legal justification or excuse for his 
Induc t although the conduct was not legally justifi-
able or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
J Under Subsection (3)(a)(i), emotional distress does 
delude: 
r , i a condition resulting from mental illness as 
Refined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the 
defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse 
under Subsection (3)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the 
actor under Subsection (3)(a)(ii) shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
easting circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as 
follows: 
(i) aggravated murder to murder; and 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted 
murder. 2001 
76-5-203. Murder. 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandes-
tine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2Xa), when 
the victim is younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse 
of a child under Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-
309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
the actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life 
that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, the actor engages in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, at-
tempted commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of any predi-
cate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; and 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in 
Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the com-
mission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace 
officer while in the commission or attempted commission 
of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 
76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making 
a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor 
uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated 
murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 
76-5-202(3); or 
76-5-204 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 308 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special 
mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or 
attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of 
another or attempted to cause the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
tress for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circum-
stances provided a legal justification or excuse for his 
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifi-
able or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does 
not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as 
defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the 
defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse 
under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the 
actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as 
follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
2000 
76-5-204. Death of other than intended victim no de-
fense. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the 
actor caused the death of a person other than the intended 
victim shall not constitute a defense for any purpose to 
criminal homicide. 1973 
76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the ac-
tor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the 
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or 
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is estab-
lished under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
* 2001 (1st S.S.) 
76-5-205.5. Special mit igat ion reduc ing the level of 
criminal homicide offense — Burden of proof 
— Application to reduce offense, 
(1) Special mitigation exists when: 
(a) the actor causes the death of another under circum-
stances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts 
under a delusion attributable to a mental illness as 
defined in Section 76-2-305; and 
(b) the nature of the delusion is such that , if the facts 
existed as the defendant believed them to be in his 
delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justifi-
cation for his conduct. 
(2) This section applies only if the defendant's actions, in 
light of his delusion, were reasonable from the objective 
viewpoint of a reasonable person. 
(3) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily 
consumed, injected, or ingested alcohol, controlled substances, 
or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense may 
not claim mitigation of the offense under this section on the 
basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, 
triggered, or substantially contributed to the mental illness. 
(4) (a) I f the tr ier of fact finds the elements of an offense a 
listed in Subsection (4)(b) are proven beyond a reasonably 
doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation 
under this section is established by a preponderance nf 
the evidence, it shall return a verdict on the reduced 
charge as provided in Subsection (4)(b). 
(b) If under Subsection (4)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) at tempted aggravated murder, the defendant 
shall instead be found guilty of attempted murder 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found 
guilty of manslaughter; or 
(iv) at tempted murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of attempted manslaughter. 
(5) (a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the 
ju ry is required to establish the existence of the special 
mitigation. 
(b) If the ju ry does find special mitigation by a unani-
mous vote, it shall re turn a verdict on the reduced charge 
as provided in Subsection (4). 
(c) If the ju ry finds by a unanimous vote that special 
mitigation has not been established, it shall convict the 
defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution 
has established all the elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(d) If the ju ry is unable to unanimously agree whether 
or not special mitigation has been established, the result 
is a hung jury. 
(6> (a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the 
trier of fact, it shall re turn a special verdict indicating 
whether the existence of special mitigation has been 
found. 
(b) The tr ier of fact shall re turn the special verdict at 
the same time as the general verdict, to indicate the basis 
for its general verdict. 
(7) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any 
case, reduce the level of an offense by more than one degree 
from tha t offense, the elements of which the evidence has 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. iw* 
76-5-206. Neg l igent homicide . 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide ifthe 
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. i973 
76-5-207. Automobi le homic ide . 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while 
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by 
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a 
degree that renders the actor incapable of safely opera -
ing the vehicle, and causes the death of another y 
operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, ^^f^ 
means simple negligence, the failure to exercise 
degree of care tha t reasonable and prudent persons exe -
cise under like or similar circumstances. J 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a seco^ 
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle w 
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or ^ r e a t ^ r U g ( 
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any ^ 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, 
degree that renders the actor incapable of safev ?P ^ 
ing the vehicle, and causes the death of ano
 t 
operating the motor vehicle in a criminally neg 
manner 
